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Abstract Synchrophasor devices guarantee situation
awareness for real-time monitoring and operational vis-
ibility of the smart grid. With their widespread imple-
mentation, significant challenges have emerged, espe-
cially in communication, data quality and cybersecu-
rity. The existing literature treats these challenges as
separate problems, when in reality, they have a com-
plex interplay. This paper conducts a comprehensive
review of quality and cybersecurity challenges for syn-
chrophasors, and identifies the interdependencies be-
tween them. It also summarizes different methods used
to evaluate the dependency and surveys how quality
checking methods can be used to detect potential cyber-
attacks. In doing so, this paper serves as a starting point
for researchers entering the fields of synchrophasor data
analytics and security.
Keywords Synchrophasors, data quality, cybersecu-
rity, methodologies.
1 Introduction
Smart grid has complex dependencies between physical
and cyber realms [1–4]. This has been demonstrated by
recent attacks on smart grid (Table 3) [5–10]. These at-
tacks exploited a limited visibility of the system and in-
adequate support from reliability coordinators [11–22].
Wide-area measurement systems (WAMS) increase the
situation awareness (SA) for operators [23–25]. WAMS
devices that are part of the wide area monitoring, pro-
tection, automation and control include phasor mea-
surement units (PMUs) at transmission, frequency dis-
turbance recorders (FDRs) at low-voltage distribution
A. Sundararajan, T. Khan, A. Moghadasi, A.I. Sarwat
EC 3920, 10555 W Flagler St, Miami, FL, USA
Email: [asund005,tkhan016,amogh004,asarwat]@fiu.edu
the date of receipt and acceptance should be inserted later
and micro-PMUs (µ−PMUs) for distributed renewables,
called synchrophasors [26–35].
Significant challenges to the implementation of syn-
chrophasors have emerged in communication, data qual-
ity and cybersecurity. The existing communication in-
frastructure is slow, expensive and inflexible. To lever-
age SA and support timeliness, adequate quality check-
ing methods must be in-place at the phasor data con-
centrators (PDCs) which aggregate and process raw
data and flag corrupt data. Due to their ubiquity, syn-
chrophasors have an increased attack surface. The ap-
plications and challenges of synchrophasors are well-
researched [36–41]. However, the challenges of data qual-
ity and cybersecurity are considered one independent of
the other, when in reality, they are interdependent [42–
69]. Further, the literature does not leverage the knowl-
edge of one challenge to address the other. For exam-
ple, studying the changes to data quality can be key to
potentially identify an underlying attack vector or an
unexploited vulnerability.
The main contributions of this paper are: (1) maps
the dependencies between data quality and cybersecu-
rity challenges of synchrophasors; (2) reviews the meth-
ods to evaluate the challenges; and (3) surveys how
data quality checking methods can leverage their obser-
vations to detect issues related to security. The paper
also provides a high-level overview of synchrophasors,
their standards, key applications, and challenges [70–
73]. It is key to know that poor quality can be due to de-
vice errors or communication challenges like congestion
and packet collision. Similarly, all cyber-attacks do not
impact the data, although reduction in quality is one of
the biggest observable consequences of a successful at-
tack. A layout of WAMS comprising synchrophasors is
shown in Fig. 1. This paper explores the challenges for
PMUs at transmission and FDRs at distribution level.
This survey paper considers data quality and cyber-
security as challenges, where each has different issues.
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Fig. 1 Layout of smart grid WAMS comprising PMUs,
µ−PMUs, FDRs and PDCs
Issues are the ways in which the particular challenge
manifests when observed. Figure 2 maps the challenges
to their corresponding issues. The challenge of quality
manifests in three ways: noise, outliers and missingness.
Noise can be due to logical inconsistencies in data values
or attributes while outliers result from poor integrity
and origination. Missing data is a direct consequence
of poor completeness and availability. Accuracy is im-
pacted by noise, outliers as well as missingness while
plausibility is a characteristic impacted by noise and
outliers. These characteristics are discussed in Section
3.1. Cybersecurity manifests as delay/loss, manipula-
tion or theft. While a delay/loss corresponds to a packet
delay or drop due to congestion, timeout, buffer full-
ness or an intentional attack that affects availability,
Fig. 2 The proposed structure of this survey paper
manipulation deals with attacks that alter the infor-
mation, thereby impacting integrity. Theft captures at-
tacks which compromise the confidentiality of data such
as snooping, spoofing or espionage. These attacks occur
at different levels of the synchrophasor hierarchy: device
corresponds to the edge devices like PMUs, FDRs, or
µ−PMUs, while aggregator implies Local PDCs or Su-
perPDCs. Communication refers to the synchrophasor
network while Application contains the different power
system applications that use synchrophasor data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 summarizes the architecture, major applications
and key challenges of synchrophasors. The characteris-
tics are described in Section 3, and their interdependen-
cies mapped in Section 4. While evaluation methods for
data quality and cybersecurity are discussed in Section
4.1, Section 4.2 surveys methods which use data quality
characteristics to detect potential cyber-attacks. Sec-
tion 5 highlights future directions of research in syn-
chrophasor data analytics and cybersecurity.
2 Architecture, Applications, Challenges
Synchrophasors can be standalone devices with dedi-
cated purposes, or be a part of a larger system like the
substations, depending on various functional and oper-
ational requirements. With increased penetration of re-
newables and smart loads, synchrophasors are used at
distribution transformers and points of common cou-
pling to study frequency disturbances and harmonics.
The architecture of synchrophasor devices are summa-
rized at the device and network levels below.
PMU device: It comprises Current Transformers
(CTs) and Potential Transformers (PTs) that measure
current and voltage magnitudes which are then con-
verted to digital data, a microprocessor module that
compiles these values, computes phasors, and synchro-
nizes them with the Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)
standard reference used by global positioning system
(GPS) receivers that acquire a time-lag based on the
atomic clock of GPS satellites [23, 74–77]. They mea-
sure local frequency and its rate of change, and can
record individual phase voltage and current along with
harmonics, negative and zero sequence values [78]. The
information paints a dynamic picture of the grid at a
given time. PMUs and PDCs transmit measured data
as frames [79]. A 16-bit cyclic redundancy check ensures
data integrity. PDCs equipped with logging functional-
ity use comma separated values or transient data ex-
change for data logs, and Common Format for Event
Data Exchange for event logs [80, 81]. The data trans-
fer rate of PMUs, which determine the message process-
ing delays and network latencies, depend greatly on the
timing requirements of applications.
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PMU network: If there are multiple PMUs in a
substation, Local PDCs aggregate site-level data and
then transmit to a SuperPDC. PDCs conduct various
data quality checks and set flags according to the is-
sues encountered, log performance, validate, transform,
scale and normalize data, and convert between proto-
cols [82]. There is typically a direct interface between
PDC and the utility’s SCADA or energy management
system. PDCs can be deployed as standalone devices or
integrated with other systems in the grid.
FDR device: The Oak Ridge National Labora-
tory and the University of Tennessee Knoxville have
been leading the FNET/GridEye project since 2004.
FDRs have been installed and managed to capture dy-
namic behaviors of the grid. Although FDRs are essen-
tially PMUs, they are connected at 120V , and hence
incur lower installation costs than traditional PMUs
do [83]. FDRs are largely deployed at renewable integra-
tion zones of the grid, and measure nearly 1, 440 sam-
ples per second with a hardware accuracy of ±0.5mHz
while PMUs measure between 10 and 240 samples per
second and use GPS receivers that have 1µs accuracy
for synchronization [84–87]. Given the availability of an
extensive discussion of the architecture by the author
of [88,89], it is beyond the scope of this paper.
FDR network: FDRs use the internet to send data
directly to the central servers for analytics and can pro-
vide information on transients, load shedding, breaker
reclosing and the switching operations of capacitor banks
and load tap changers [87]. Unlike PMUs, FDRs can be
installed at buildings and offices.
Synchrophasor standards:Multiple standards ex-
ist for PMU data measurement, transfer and commu-
nication, proposed by IEEE, the National Institute of
Standards & Technology (NIST), the North American
Electric Reliability Commission (NERC) and the In-
ternational Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) [90–97].
Due to multiple specifications and guidelines, there are
possible contradictions in recommendations [70–73,98].
A North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI)
report in early 2016 identified the need for standard-
izing definitions related to synchrophasor data quality
and availability by establishing the PMU applications
requirements task force (PARTF) [99]. IEEE standard
C37.X deals with WAMS, specifically PMUs [82, 100,
101]. These standards are summarized in Table 1 with
their core contributions highlighted. A more compre-
hensive review of the synchrophasor standards is docu-
mented in [102].
Applications: Synchrophasors streamline security,
reliability and stability of power systems. They have
online and offline applications [103]. Online applica-
tions of PMUs include enhancing real-time SA, analyz-
ing faults and disturbances, detecting and appraising
oscillations and harmonics that impact power quality,
and improving accuracy and reducing computational
time of state estimation. Offline applications include
congestion management, providing effective protection
schemes, benchmarking, system restoration, overload
monitoring and dynamic rating, validating the network
model of SCADA, and improving overall power qual-
ity [25,104,105]. Real-time (online) applications of FDRs
include frequency monitoring interface integrated with
command and control centers in the future for power
system health diagnosis to prevent cascading failures,
and event trigger module that detects and notifies the
mismatch between generation and load caused by fre-
quency variations. Offline applications include event vi-
sualization that renders the data read from the even
data files [106].
Challenges: One of the major drawbacks of syn-
chrophasors is the lack of transmission protocol, which
makes them vulnerable to spoofing attacks [26]. The
existing architecture is not scalable since it entails an
initially high investment. NASPI’s research initiative
task force (RITT) emphasizes optimal placement as
a significant challenge but also one dependent on the
nature of applications the utility intends to use them
for [18]. The literature has multiple models including
but not limited to genetic algorithm, simulated anneal-
ing, Tabu search, Madtharads method, particle swarm
optimization, artificial neural networks, binary search
and binary integer programming to address this chal-
lenge [27, 28, 31–34, 107, 108]. More recently, manag-
ing and analyzing large volumes of synchrophasor data
has become increasingly challenging. Lack of standard-
ized data management solutions for smart grid has only
made this problem more challenging. The ubiquitous
presence of these devices has expanded their attack
surface, making them vulnerable to different types of
attacks. These two challenges are elaborated in the fol-
lowing section since they percolate to applications that
directly operate upon the streaming data subject to
minimal processing owing to timeliness requirements.
3 Data Quality and Cybersecurity Challenges
in Synchrophasors
Due to their wide-ranging communication and automa-
tion capabilities, the challenges of synchrophasor data
quality and cybersecurity have gained prominence.
3.1 Data Quality Challenges
NERC’s real-time tools best practices task force (RTBPTF)
and NASPI’s PARTF impose requirements to ensure
synchrophasor data quality [42, 109]. Data quality can
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Table 1 Various standards and guidelines for Synchrophasors
Body Standard Core Contribution
IEEE
1344-1995 Original parameter definitions for synchrophasors
C37.118-2005 Improved message formats, inclusion of time quality, Total Vector Error (TVE)
C37.239-2010 PMU/PDC event logging
1711-2010 Serial SCADA Protection Protocol for substation serial link cybersecurity
C37.118.1-2011 PMU measurement provisions, performance requirements
C37.118.2-2011 Synchrophasor data transfer requirements
C37.238-2011 Common profile for applying Precision Time Protocol (PTP) using Ethernet
C37.242-2013 Synchronization, calibration, testing and installation of PMUs for PC
C37.244-2013 PDC functions and requirements for PC and monitoring
C37.111-2013 PMU/PDC data logging using COMFEDE
1686-2013 Procuring, installing and commissioning IED cybersecurity
C37.240-2014 Sound engineering practices for high cybersecurity of substation APC
IEC
61850 Interoperable and adaptable architectures to substation automation
61850-90-5 Requirements for data exchange between PMUs, PDCs, PCs and control center
62351-1,2 Security threats and vulnerabilities in smart grid devices
62351-6 Prescribes digital signature using asymmetric cryptography for sending PMU data
NERC CIP 002-009 Series of standards to ensure enterprise, field and personnel security
NIST NISTIR 7628 Provides guidelines for smart grid cybersecurity (including WAMS)
be contextualized in different ways, depending on the
needs of the concerned domain. For instance, data qual-
ity requirements of a smart meter recording energy con-
sumption might differ from those of a net meter at a
solar photovoltaic (PV) power plant. NASPI contextu-
alizes synchrophasor data quality to determine “fitness
of use” in terms of accuracy and lineage for static data
points; lineage, completeness and logical consistency for
static datasets; and availability, timeliness and origina-
tion for streams of data points [42].
There could be different causes for poor data qual-
ity: a) Device: poor calibration of device, biases due
to CT, PT; erroneous filter design, poor synchroniza-
tion of timing measurements, and issues due to mea-
surement channel; b) Communication: latency exceed-
ing stipulated limits, network congestion, signal inter-
ferences and failure of communication nodes; c) Aggre-
gator: Data transformation resulting in errors, delayed
arrival of packets dropped due to time-limit exceeding,
and unwanted duplication or corruption of data during
computations; and d) Application: storage and main-
tenance issues, insufficient training size, erroneous ma-
nipulations to the data and poor association of context.
Although data quality requirements vary with applica-
tions, they have been extensively documented [42, 52,
102,109]. The existing literature on synchrophasor data
quality is summarized in Table 2.
Completeness: focuses on the gaps between different
values, accounts for missing values [42]. The attributes
of completeness defined at device and aggregator-levels
are: gap rate- number of gaps in data per unit time;
mean gap size- mean of the length of known gaps; and
largest known gap- length of the largest known gap
among the different gaps. While completeness is im-
pacted by device malfunction, packet drops and com-
munication link failure, the literature does not recog-
nize the possibility of an attack behind such causes.
Accuracy: can be of the value or attribute, primarily
measured in Total Vector Error (TVE), which accord-
ing to IEEE standard C37.118, is the vector difference
between the measured and expected phasor value (mag-
nitude, angle and frequency). Accuracy is categorized
into that of: data values- impacted by factors like the
difference between expected and observed signals or the
introduction of noise to the data within the synchropha-
sor; and data attributes- affected by factors like accu-
racy of the measured timestamp, agreement between
encoded and actual location coordinates of the device,
and alignment of the location recorded in the power
system topology with its actual location [46].
Plausibility and Availability: Measurement speci-
fiers are the attributes of data which describe whether
the process of measuring some phenomenon of the power
system (observed value) and calculating its value (ex-
pected value) are documented effectively in terms of
standard units to a given precision and are within a
stated confidence interval [46,48]. These specifiers have
decisive sub-attributes influencing the qualitative value
of data: data representing the measurement of quality
or condition of the grid, and data represented in the
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Table 2 Summary of existing research in Synchrophasor Data Quality Challenges and Solutions
Attribute Challenges Solutions
Completeness
(Device,
aggregator) [42,50,
144]
– PMU/PDC device damage
– Faulty PMU-PDC communication
– Network error
– Database storage error
– Data missing for failing to comply with
latency and QoS requirements
– Acquiring better management techniques
– Use of TCP protocol to re-transmit the lost
data packets at the cost of timeliness
– Adjusting the synchrophasor frame rate by in-
creasing the wait time at PDC
Measurement
Accuracy
(Device) [42,43,138–
140,144]
– Expected signal differs from measured
signal due to harmonic interference
– Introduction of noise to data
– Improving phase error using filtering techniques
– NIST calibration per Standard C37.118-2005
– Omnidirectional antennas
– Context-based reconstruction of missing data
– Network Time Protocol (NTP), e-Loran and
Chip Scale Atomic Clock (CSAC)
Attribute Accuracy
(Device, aggregator,
communication) [42,
44]
– Measured vs actual timestamp discrep-
ancy due to satellite timing error; dis-
agreement between encoded and actual
location of PMU
– Development of linear state estimation tools
– Avoiding timestamp discrepancy by modifying
real-time clock element
– Using OMP-based identification, BB algorithm
to solve PMU location discrepancies
Plausibility and
Availability
(Communication,
application) [47–49,
51,142,143]
– Impact of measurement system on indi-
vidual data points
– Data inaccessibility due to high network
latency or device failure.
– Delayed data arrival due to increased
routing traffic
– Use of Electrical Data Recorder (EDR) tools
for capturing high-rate time series data, data
storage and analysis
– A more lenient time limit could be set for non-
critical application usage.
– Latency-aware application design
Origination (Device,
aggregator,
communication,
application) [42,53,
145,146]
– Poor standard interpretation, imple-
mentation
– Misalignment, erroneous compression
– Latency, loss of communication nodes
– Data corruption due to delivery time of
PDC exceeding permissible slot
– Network unavailability to process in-
coming data streams
– Redundancy in communication by using wire-
less and wired connections
– Lagrange interpolating polynomial method
– Data substitution, imputation, interpolation
and extrapolation
– Stochastic forecasting with Prediction Error
Minimization (PEM)
Logical Consistency
(Aggregator,
communication) [42]
– Data transmitted contains no headers
– Sampling rate of data changed at PMU
without being adjusted at PDC
– Data duplication while processing
– Data from different PMUs with incor-
rect timestamps
– Logical consistency can be ensured by main-
taining the PMU registries and data protocols
form of SI units up to 3 decimal places with a confi-
dence interval included.
Network availability plays an important role in stream-
ing data [49], and in-turn affects data availability. In
case of high network latency, the incoming data streams
from different synchrophasors get delayed or lost, caus-
ing applications to perceive them as missing or incom-
plete. Hence, network availability can be considered an
indirect attribute affecting quality. This can be miti-
gated if the overlying applications are programmed to
account for the delays, or if a more lenient waiting time
limit is set. However, the second solution is dependent
on the kind of applications the synchrophasors cater
to. The latency requirements for synchrophasors rec-
ommended by the standards are very stringent.
Origination: is the source from which the data is mea-
sured. Its trustworthiness is associated with the back-
ground and source. Its attributes are: point of origin:
the class of device from where the data originated (Mea-
surement (M) or Performance (P) for PMUs), the stan-
dard followed by the device, and any data manipula-
tion or standardization techniques through which the
data passes [42, 110]; coverage: physical location of the
device based on its geospatial or electrical topology lo-
cation [44, 45]; and transformation applied to the data
at the device, aggregator or application level.
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Table 3 Summary of the Recent Cyberattacks on Smart Grid Impacting Data Quality
Source of Attack
(Year)
Target of Attack Data Quality
Characteristic
Impacted
Cybersecurity
Characteristic
Impacted
Attack Specifics
Vulnerability in
network firewall
(2001)
California ISO (CAISO)
web servers
Consistency,
accuracy
Integrity Poor security
configuration during
planned maintenance
Stuxnet worm (2010) Programmable Logic
Controllers (PLCs) at
SCADA
Accuracy,
consistency,
plausibility
Integrity,
Availability
Exploits zero-day
vulnerabilities of
PLCs
BlackEnergy (2011) Human-Machine
Interface of utility grid
control systems
Plausibility, origin,
accuracy, consistency
Confidentiality,
Integrity,
Availability
General Electric’s
HMI targeted
Remote Access
Trojan; watering-hole
attack (2014)
ICS/SCADA Plausibility, origin,
accuracy, consistency
Confidentiality,
Integrity,
Availability
Conducted by
Dragonfly, Energetic
Bear
Trojan.Laziok
reconnaissance
malware (2015)
Energy companies Origin, plausibility Confidentiality Gathered
information from
compromised devices
BlackEnergy3 (2015) Ukrainian grid control
center
Plausibility, origin,
accuracy, consistency
Confidentiality,
Integrity,
Availability
Lack of SA left
220,000+ customers
without power
WannaCry
ransomware
cryptoworm (2017)
Computers running MS
Windows Operating
System
Availability, origin Availability Used EternalBlue, a
vulnerability in older
Windows systems
Consistency: determines how agreeable the data is
with the overall structure of its type. Incompatibility of
attributes in terms of measurement rates or header la-
beling between datasets results in outliers, leading to an
inconsistent result from an application. The attributes
of consistency are: Header frame consistency: consis-
tency of the Header frame of the device. This could
be categorized into: persistence of PMU Header that
states whether the PMU header structure is consis-
tent over time, and persistence of PDC Header that
states whether the PDC header structure is consistent
over time; Data frame consistency: consistency of Data
frames of the device. This could be categorized into:
persistence of PMU Data frame that states whether the
PMU data frame structure is consistent over time, and
persistence of the PDC Data frame that states whether
the PDC data frame structure is consistent over time;
order consistency of Data frames: whether the order in
which the Data frames are recorded is consistent in the
device; consistency in compliance to standards recom-
mended for PMU and all the devices associated with it;
and consistency of reporting rate: whether data report-
ing rate is consistent across all devices.
Emerging research in this area has lately focused on
determining solutions for ensuring data quality. These
solutions include using omnidirectional antennas to im-
prove GPS availability, context-aware determination of
missing data streams using accurate timing informa-
tion, Network Time Protocol (NTP) and associated chip
scale atomic clocks (CSACs) as backups for synchro-
nization when GPS fails, imputation, interpolation and
extrapolation, stochastic forecasting with prediction er-
ror minimization (PEM) and data substitution [52].
Evaluation of Quality: Methods to evaluate quality
is discussed in Section 4.1. The approach for perfor-
mance evaluation is to first study the impacts of device
calibration and network conditions on quality, then ex-
amine how poor quality reduces the application per-
formance [42]. Two effective methods are proposed to
evaluate the impact of quality on performance: bench-
marking that tests an application multiple times with
numerous erroneous datasets in contrast to those with
no known errors, and standardization that documents,
for each application, the level of tolerable errors.
3.2 Cybersecurity Challenges
Synchrophasors cater to applications like state estima-
tion, contingency analysis and optimal power flow that
need real-time high-resolution data measurement, com-
munication and analytics [111]. Therefore, a successful
attack on these devices might cause erroneous SA or
cascading failures [56,112]. Yet, many industrial organi-
zations do not consider synchrophasors as critical cyber
assets. Recent cyberattacks on the smart grid (Table 3)
mostly used powerful malware like worms, viruses or
Trojan horse, but a few attacks like the one on the Pa-
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Table 4 Summary of Existing Research in Synchrophasor Cybersecurity Challenges and Solutions
Level Challenges Solutions
Device,
Aggregator [54,55,
97,102,137,144]
– Device damage
– Device calibration tam-
pering
– Forging PMU data
– GPS spoofing
– Multi-alteration technique to trace adversary in event of GPS
spoofing
– Visible GPS satellite prediction
– Anomaly between expected and measured GPS signals
– Using SSL/TLS or IPSec to encrypt data before transmission
– Using state estimation technique to mitigate device calibra-
tion and tampering
– Rigorous penetration testing prior to installation
Communication [57,
61,62,66,139–143]
– Denial of Service
– Man-in-the-Middle
– False Data Injection
– Snooping attack
– Delay attack
– Airgapping PMU network
– Filtering routers, disabling IP broadcasts, applying security
patches, disabling unused ports
– Server authentication by clients before establishing connection
– Use of time-series state estimation
– Cryptographic methods like AES, DES
– Mutual authentication
– Cyber trust model with blockchains
– NASPInet hub-spoke model
– Optimal key generation and distribution
Application [63–65,
145,146]
– Phishing and social engi-
neering
– APT and insider threats
– Replay attacks
– Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA)
– Use of secure data transfer protocol to prevent replay attack
cific Gas & Electric transmission substation relied on
physical means. These attacks jeopardized not just the
availability of power but also that of control data (in-
formation). Cybersecurity of synchrophasors are cate-
gorized into: 1) Device, Aggregator, 2) Communication,
and 3) Control center application.
Device, Aggregator: NASPI Network (NASPInet) is
logically capable of integrating WAMS across multiple
geographically distant organizations using phasor gate-
ways (PGWs). The attacks at this level compromise
data integrity, targeting devices from individual PMUs
to PDCs, SuperPDCs or even PGWs. Some attacks in-
clude: 1) tampering the signal measurement units of
devices through interference, 2) illicitly changing the
calibration of devices to report erroneous readings, 3)
forging data to reflect wrong measurements, and 4)
GPS spoofing by broadcasting fabricated signals to the
receiver to yield erroneous synchronization of phasors
computed, modifying satellite position, or replaying le-
gitimate GPS signals at later timestamps [54].
GPS spoofing can be mitigated by enabling the re-
ceiver to predict visible GPS satellites at a given posi-
tion and time instant and use the Coarse/Acquisition
(C/A) code from those satellites. Another strategy com-
pares the measured GPS signal to the estimated signal
and computes the anomaly error which must have an
accuracy of ≤ 40ns for nearly 95% of the values accord-
ing to IEEE C37.118 [44]. Synchrophasors must be sub-
ject to rigorous testing before installation. Some meth-
ods include port scans, device security feature robust-
ness, network congestion testing, denial of service test-
ing, network traffic sniffing and disclosure testing [55].
These tests should be periodically conducted by cer-
tified white hat penetration testers after installation.
Regular patches and configuration updates must be made
down to the end-device level.
Communication: Synchrophasors support bidirectional
communication channels, where data measurements flow
from devices to the control center while control signals
flow the other way. The vulnerabilities of the protocols
used by the devices also contribute to the overall secu-
rity. Attacks on communication channels compromise
integrity, availability and confidentiality. Some attacks
include: 1) Denial of Service (DoS) by overwhelming
PMUs, PDCs or other aggregation devices higher in the
hierarchy with bogus frames so that legitimate frames
are lost, delayed, denied or dropped, 2) Man-in-the-
Middle (MITM) attacks by a malicious entity posing
itself as PDC (to PMU) or PGW (to PDC) and send-
ing malicious commands that causes PMUs/PDCs to
behave in an abnormal manner that triggers failures, 3)
False Data Injection (FDI) by intercepting frames over
the channel, altering or replacing them with malicious
information that then gets propagated to higher levels
of the WAMS, 4) Snooping by the attacker eavesdrop-
ping on the channel for incoming or outgoing frames,
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Table 5 Summary of the Interdependency between Quality and Cybersecurity Challenges
Level Quality Attribute Quality Issue Cyber-Attack
Observed
Security
Attribute
Impacted
Device Completeness, accuracy,
plausibility
Synchronization signal
loss, measurement signal
loss, missing data
GPS spoofing, replay,
device tamper, changing
device calibration, FDI
Integrity
Aggregator Origin, consistency,
plausibility
Corrupted data,
anomalies, outliers
FDI, Tampering, Buffer
overflow, MITM
Confidentiality,
Integrity
Communication Availability, origin,
consistency
Anomalies, outliers,
inconsistent, out-of-order
data
DoS, MITM, FDI,
snooping, replay, delay
Confidentiality,
Integrity,
availability
Application Origin, availability,
consistency, completeness,
accuracy
DoS, delay, APT, FDI,
theft/fraud, insider
attack
corrupted data,
missingness, anomalies,
outliers
Confidentiality,
Integrity,
Availability
typically not modifying or stealing but just capturing a
copy of that information for packet replay or espionage,
and 5) Delay caused by compromising communication
routers that deliberately induce latencies in propaga-
tion to critically affect the grid’s SA.
Many authentication and authorization algorithms
are proposed to secure synchrophasor data over commu-
nication channels [57]. These methods range from con-
ventional encryption methods to cyber trust. Due to the
ubiquity and widespread range of these devices, key dis-
tribution and management becomes a problem. Mutual
authentication is also proposed to account for trust [61].
Decentralized, blockchain-based trust acquisition is be-
ing considered too. The publish-subscribe hub-spoke
architecture proposed by NASPInet supports dynamic
sharing of device data to alleviate shortcomings of the
communication medium like delays and latencies. Stan-
dards like IEC 61850-90-5 recommend trusted key dis-
tribution center to generate and distribute keys that
meet system requirements [63–66].
Application: Despite being protected by enterprise
security tools for intrusion detection and prevention,
virtualization, segmentation, authentication, authoriza-
tion and access control, cyberattacks still proliferate [67,
68]. It is understood that any successful attack at the
other two levels perpetrated in a manner undetectable
by the enterprise security systems can pose a significant
threat. The attacks at this level are the most danger-
ous, since crucial power system applications use data
from WAMS to conduct analysis to address reliability,
power quality, network topology, and faults. An ad-
verse impact on these calculations could compromise
the “self-healing” nature of the grid. More recent solu-
tions include game theory, machine learning, proactive
data visualization, and Defense-in-depth [12,113].
3.2.1 Evaluation of Security
Works have tested the resilience of PMUs and PDCs
against different attacks. The authors in [114] conducted
penetration testing of a synchrophasor network in IEEE
68-bus system to map vulnerabilities against the Com-
mon Vulnerabilities Exposure (CVE) database. Poten-
tial corrective measures to ensure the security of PMUs
and PDCs is proposed [115]. Considering the security at
substation and information levels, the authors provide a
wide range of tools to mitigate breaches at both fronts.
A multilayered architecture at the substation is pro-
posed where different levels of data abstraction is pro-
vided between PMUs and external environment, sup-
plemented by firewalls, User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
Secure for communication over untrusted networks, and
remote access using Secure Shell (SSH).
4 The Data Quality-Cybersecurity Dependency
The severity of an attack can be understood from the
extent of its impacts on the targeted system. With
the smart grid encouraging interoperability between de-
vices, information, applications, and protocols, a trans-
parent and direct information exchange is now feasible.
This also means that if information in one of the inter-
connected systems is infected, it is bound to propagate
to other systems upon exchange, affecting the whole
network. Synchrophasor devices harbor such vulnera-
bilities, as summarized in Section 3.2. However, to mit-
igate cyberattacks on interconnected systems, the rela-
tionship between devices and data must be known.
Table 5 summarizes key interdependencies between
the two challenges. There is a tight coupling between
data quality and cyber-attacks, implying it is wise to
study synchrophasor cybersecurity by accounting for
the impacts on quality. In most attacks, plausibility,
completeness, accuracy and consistency are primarily
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Table 6 Summary of Evaluation Methods for Quality (DQ) and Cybersecurity (CS) Issues
Issue Challenge Evaluation Methods
Noise (DQ) Consistency, accuracy – Cable configuration, testing, validation
– Specifying confidence interval, precision, TVE,
ROCOF for measurements
– Evaluating instrumentation channels
– Model-based correction
– State estimation-based error filtering
– Presistence in Data/Header frames
– Standards compliance
Outlier (DQ) Consistency, origin, accuracy – Standardization, benchmarking
– Enhancing endpoints with switches, routers
– Specifying device model, coverage and content
Missingness (DQ) Completeness, availability, accuracy – Dedicated communication channels
– Enhancing endpoints with switches, routers
Delay/loss (CS) All levels – Regular penetration testing of all levels
– Link-level encryption, selective encryption
– Dedicated communication channels
– Data redundancy for fault tolerance
Manipulation (CS) Device, Aggregator, Communication – Regular penetration testing of all levels
– Link-level encryption, selective encryption
– Data abstraction, multi-layered architecture
– Data redundancy for fault tolerance
– Augmenting ID/IPS, firewalls, ACLs, VPNs
Theft (CS) Device, Aggregator, Communication – Regular penetration testing of all levels
– Data abstraction, multi-layered architecture
– Data redundancy for fault tolerance
– Augmenting firewalls, ACLs, VPNs
impacted [152, 153]. In Section 4.1, specific evaluation
methods for quantifying this relationship are reviewed.
Section 4.2 looks at how data quality characteristics
can be used as markers to detect potential cyber-attacks
within the context of synchrophasors. Results from these
subsections are summarized in Tables 6 and 7, respec-
tively.
4.1 Interdependency Evaluation Methods
Next to communications, cybersecurity was found to
impact the design and installation costs for synchropha-
sors [116]. This is because they are critical to the mission-
support systems of the grid. Different practical ways for
utilities to mitigate quality issues like accuracy, time-
liness and consistency are also identified. Some meth-
ods include employing dedicated communication chan-
nels between PMUs and PDCs, encrypting PMU data
before communication, and enhancing communication
endpoints using firewalls and routers. The report, how-
ever, does not delve into the details of how such meth-
ods could impact latency (and hence, timeliness) and
availability of the data.
Given different manufacturers of devices, there will
be differences in measurement and calibration quality
despite adhering to the standards. The varying applica-
tion requirements cause differences in application-level
PMU performance, of which data quality is a major one.
The static and dynamic PMU testing efforts of the Per-
formance and Standards Task Team (PSTT) of NASPI
and the PMU performance characterization are briefly
summarized in [117]. In it, the different steady-state
tests performed on magnitude, phase and frequency
evaluate their conformance to accuracy requirements,
which is an important attribute of data quality and is
a direct target of many cyberattacks. Given the impact
of instrumentation channels on the quality, they have
been well-characterized and evaluated for impacts on
accuracy in the literature. The errors induced by them
could be rectified through model-based correction algo-
rithms and state estimation based error filtering. Some
other avenues where data quality could be evaluated
include the cable configurations, testing and validating
the devices to ensure accurate, consistent performance
and interoperability at all levels [118, 119]. Although
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not explicit, these works hint at the improvement in
the resilience of synchrophasor devices against poten-
tially malicious activities by accounting for proper test-
ing methods to characterize and evaluate the different
sources of errors prior to deployment that might con-
tribute to poor quality.
Final conclusions can be gathered from [120]. The
report by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
(PNNL) analyzes existing synchrophasor networks in
terms of their communication and information-level in-
teroperability, security and performance. It concluded
that latency is a key issue for the future synchropha-
sor designs which is expected to compound latency due
to PDC functionality. It also emphasized that substa-
tions generally did not employ redundancy; there is
little consistency in adoption of security methods for
synchrophasor networks. Some tools include link-level
encryption, virtual private networks (VPNs), ID/IPS,
firewalls and access control lists (ACLs). Further, ex-
isting data quality checking methods locate a compro-
mise in integrity by identifying faulted data values (due
to measurement errors, communication delays or exter-
nal events) but not due to result of device tampering,
MITM, spoofing or FDI. Since both faults and attacks
have the same impact on quality, it is important to
differentiate the two causes while checking for the at-
tributes such as accuracy, consistency and timeliness.
To summarize, the following measures can be used
as metrics to quantify data quality: TVE, errors in mag-
nitude, phase, frequency and ROCOF, harmonics and
noise for measurement accuracy; comparison between
measured and expected results, confidence interval and
precision for measurement specifiers; temporal, geospa-
tial and topological accuracy for attribute accuracy;
device model specifications, geospatial and topological
coordinates, coverage and content for origination; per-
sistence in Header and Data frames, standards compli-
ance, reporting rate and order for logical consistency;
and gap rate, gap size and largest known gap for com-
pleteness. Benchmarking and standardization are two
methods that can be used to evaluate data quality. Sim-
ilarly, cybersecurity can be quantified by conducting
extensive penetration testing of the synchrophasor net-
works integrated into benchmarked IEEE bus systems
for different types of attacks (DoS, MITM, FDI, spoof-
ing, probing, cache poisoning) and discovering poten-
tial vulnerabilities that could be exploited. While doing
so, it would be important to also repeat the evaluation
of the quality attributes using the above metrics and
explore how they are impacted due to the specific at-
tacks, and whether they violate the industry standards
requirements specified for different applications.
4.2 Addressing Cyber-attacks Using Quality Issues
It can be seen from Table 7 that successful cyberattacks
compromise synchrophasor data quality since the secu-
rity requirements are violated [121]. Given synchropha-
sors use TCP/UDP on the transport layer for their
communications, attacks typically possible on TCP/IP
stack like DoS, MITM, packet replay or spoofing are
possible in synchrophasor domains as well.
Physical attacks like device tampering causes loss
or incurs theft of critical information, easily observed
through large gaps sizes, poor accuracy in obtained
values and unreliable origin. The lost data is typically
handled through substitution, either statistical or in-
telligent [122, 123]. The best way to prevent physical
attacks like cable disconnects, direct damage to device,
etc. is by ensuring the devices are isolated from external
weather and human elements.
Spoofing synchrophasor data is achievable through
polynomial fitting or data mirroring techniques. Such
attacks impact quality that manifests as outliers or noise.
Several methods have been proposed to counter these
attacks: intra-PMU and inter-PMU correlations to de-
termine the relationship between PMU parameters and
across PMUs in a locality, respectively; machine learn-
ing techniques like Support Vector Machines (SVMs)
and more [124–126].
GPS spoofing exploits publicly available civilian GPS
signals using air or cable to produce signals that ini-
tially align with the original, but slowly start increas-
ing the power to drown the authentic signal and thereby
compromising the receiver [54,127]. By introducing mea-
surement errors in the time synchronization, the at-
tacks induce changes in data consistency and plausi-
bility which can be used as markers to identify the like-
lihood of the attack [128–130].
In a successful DoS where multiple synchrophasor
devices get compromised, packet delay or loss is ob-
served. This impact in quality can serve a clue to the
onset of DoS-style attacks. Typical solutions involve
augmenting inline blocking tools, high bandwidth con-
nections, disabling IP broadcasts and port hardening.
MITM is possible in synchrophasors where the at-
tacker acts as a legitimate PDC to the PMUs and vice-
versa, thereby intercepting and/or modifying all mes-
sages exchanged. This is noticed by quality checking
methods in the form of poor accuracy and consistency
in values between what was sent by PMU and what was
received by PDC. It can be avoided by having the de-
vices employ mutual authentication and a digital cer-
tificate mechanism with an actively managed Certifi-
cate Revocation Lists (CRLs) and certificate authori-
ties [59,123].
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Table 7 Summary Showing How Quality Can Help Identify Cybersecurity Issues
Cyber-attack Quality Affected Quality Check Looks For Mitigation Methods Using Quality
Device tampering
(delay/loss, theft)
[122,123]
Completeness,
plausibility, accuracy,
consistency,
origination
Large gap sizes, inaccurate
readings, ping fail
– Statistical substitution: regression, im-
putation, interpolation
– Intelligent substitution: neural net-
works, logistic regression, optimization
– Securing the physical devices
Spoofing PMU data
(manipulation)
[124–126]
Consistency,
accuracy, plausibility
Unexpected values, errors,
mismatch with SCADA
values, redundant
timestamp, out-of-order
packet arrival
– Monitoring line impedances for anoma-
lies
– Divergence and miscorrelation between
SCADA and PMU data
GPS Spoofing
(manipulation,
delay/loss)
[54,127–129]
Consistency,
origination,
plausibility
Inaccurate timing value,
TVE > 1%, packets arrive
out-of-order
– Using multiple synchronization sources
or telecommunications
– Anti-spoofing checking methods at re-
ceivers
– Internal holdover oscillators as backups
for providing accurate timing signals
– Spoofing match algorithm with Golden
Search for lighter computation
Denial of Service
(delay/loss)
[123]
Completeness,
accuracy, consistency
Congestion at
PDCs/network, delayed
arrival of packets, dropped
packets, inability to reach
suspected device
– Augmenting PDCs with inline blocking
tools
– Employ port hardening and disable IP
broadcasts
– Use high bandwidth communications
(expensive)
Man-in-the-Middle
(delay/loss,
manipulation, theft)
[123]
Origination,
accuracy, availability,
consistency
Mismatch between obtained
and expected value,
abnormal delay in packet
arrival
– Mutual authentication, message au-
thentication codes
– Digital certificates with active manage-
ment of CRLs
False Data Injection
(manipulation, theft)
[131–135]
Plausibility,
consistency, accuracy,
origination
Mismatch with SCADA
values, unexpected values,
spatio-temporal outliers
– Spatio-temporal correlations, density-
based local outlier factoring
– Monitor line impedance for anomalies
– Random time-hopping of packets
– Divergence and miscorrelation between
SCADA and PMU data
Snooping, Sniffing
(theft)
[59,123]
Plausibility, origin No observable changes-
additional analysis needed
– Using secure gateway/VPN communi-
cation
– Employing TLS/SSL, SSH, lightweight
selective encryption
Delay (delay/loss)
[59,123]
Completeness,
consistency,
availability, accuracy
Observable patterns in gaps,
slow arrival of packets
– Statistical and intelligent substitutions
– Redundant measurement devices on the
same line
APT, Insider threat
(delay/loss, theft,
manipulation) [113]
Accuracy,
consistency, origin,
plausibility
No observable changes-
additional analysis needed
– Defense-in-depth
– Machine learning, advanced data ana-
lytics
FDI impacts the consistency, accuracy and plausi-
bility of the data. The effects are typically observed
as spatio-temporal outliers in the data. Quality check-
ing methods check for this anomaly and may employ
correlation across different timestamps to identify the
corruption of data. FDI is one of the widely explored
attacks on synchrophasor domain, with solutions like
determining the mismatch between the values obtained
from PMUs and that observed in SCADA, monitoring
the line impedances which get affected when data is ma-
nipulated, and using density-based Local Outlier Filter
(LOF) analysis [131–135].
12 Aditya Sundararajan, Tanwir Khan, Amir Moghadasi, Arif I. Sarwat
Sometimes, attackers simply capture the packets flow-
ing in a channel with an intent to listen. Such sniff-
ing/snooping attacks have been conducted using Wire-
Shark to realize messages are exchanged in plaintext.
This attack is difficult to detect using data quality check-
ing methods since most often, no quality characteristic
is impacted as the attackers do not affect the data ac-
tively. However, technologies like VPN, encryption of
selective messages (to reduce the overall process over-
head), or Transport Layer Security (TLS)/Secure Socket
Layer (SSL), Secure Shell (SSH) can be used to miti-
gate them. While TLS has been shown to be susceptible
to poisoning attacks and VPN to side channel attacks,
careful network design can account for them [123,136].
With the increased frequency of campaign efforts
and nation-sponsored attacks against the grid, synchro-
phasors could be lucrative targets for sophisticated at-
tacks like advanced persistent threats (APTs), social
engineering, watering-hole attacks and malware-based
intrusions [147–151]. While these attacks scale beyond
specific devices in the synchrophasor hierarchy, the qual-
ity checking methods alone would not be sufficient [113].
The use of defense-in-depth model augmented with stake-
holder interactions, awareness and training, and intel-
ligent solutions like machine learning for attack data
classification and/or event prediction, root-cause anal-
ysis of observed events, developing evolving defense to-
pographies using moving target defense, and advanced
visualization techniques for efficient cognition of events
would play a critical role.
The key takeaway from this section is that impacts
on data quality can provide strong markers for an un-
derlying cyber-attack. Noise, outliers and missing val-
ues are all commonly observed issues which quality check-
ing methods may be programmed to detect, analyze
and base decisions on. Certain sophisticated attacks
like APTs, insider threats, sniffing, and social engineer-
ing have indirect impacts on quality which a checking
method may not be able to detect with enough con-
fidence or precision. Additional solutions are required
to mitigate such attacks in the synchrophasor domain.
These solutions include statistical methods like diver-
gence, correlation, regression and substitution; intelli-
gent methods like neural networks and evolutionary al-
gorithms for event classification and prediction, logistic
regression for substitution; technologies like VPNs, fire-
walls, ID/IPS, anomaly detectors, selective encryption,
port hardening, network isolation and use of TLS/SSL,
SSH; and human-in-the-loop solutions like advanced
visualization techniques, awareness and training, and
stakeholder engagements. While the impacts on quality
can also be due to underlying device or measurement
errors, most of the works in the literature assume the
data has been subject to delay/loss, manipulation or
theft intentionally. This paves way for the recommen-
dation that the upcoming research in this area must
look at ways to differentiate the impacts on data qual-
ity due to attacks from errors.
5 Future Directions of Research and Conclusion
The future directions of research in the areas of syn-
chrophasor data quality, cybersecurity and communi-
cations are multi-faceted. Addressing data quality chal-
lenges must begin with a strong push to the adoption of
industry-wide, vendor-agnostic data management, pro-
cessing and storage standards for smart grid. Most re-
cent cyber-attacks were successful due to the difference
in speed of cognition of the information generated by
automated vulnerability detection tools and the speed
with which the machine data is created (called cogni-
tive gap) [113]. The design of synchrophasor devices
are also expected to improve in the future [103]. Keep-
ing in mind the quality challenges, an improvement
to PDC design called flexible integrated synchropha-
sor system (FIPS) was proposed to minimize issues in
quality and communication, and tackles specific tasks
of PDC such as data alignment, employs cryptographic
methods to ensure confidential exchange of data with-
out jeopardizing integrity, and establishes relevance to
the NASPInet [137]. To ensure device and application-
level interoperability, development of technical stan-
dards and conformance testing rules is expected. Fur-
ther, the emergence of distribution-level µ−PMUs will
evoke the need for developing measurement, commu-
nication, quality and security standards. Further, with
the deployment of distributed renewable sources, elec-
tric and autonomous vehicles, energy storage and trans-
active energy, there is a strong impetus for enhancing
technologies behind monitoring and control, of which
synchrophasors will play a major role [116].
To conclude, while existing research has focused on
the synchrophasor challenges of quality and cybersecu-
rity individually, their interdependency has largely been
ignored. This paper makes one of the first attempts
at highlighting the impacts of cyber-attacks on various
quality attributes, thereby recommending that the fu-
ture research on the design and development of security
solutions should account for their impacts on quality as
well, and that different quality characteristics can be
used by quality checking methods to flag for potential
cyber-attacks. Plausibility, completeness, accuracy and
consistency are some of the attributes that are most ad-
versely impacted by a majority of the attacks on syn-
chrophasors. At the same time, not all cases of poor
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data quality imply a successful cyber-attack as the rea-
son. Different metrics that could be used to quantify
quality attributes were summarized, and the methods
that help evaluate the impacts of quality and security
on performance were also briefly highlighted. This pa-
per serves as a starting point for researchers entering
these areas as it summarizes and determines their in-
terdependency and relevance to smart grid security.
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